Since organizational homogeneity may reduce or eliminate agency problems, understanding its sources is important for the trade-off between firms and markets and for organization design. This paper shows that a firm's members will develop homogenous beliefs through shared experiences. Organizations with a long and successful history and high employee involvement will have the most homogenous beliefs.
Introduction
Agency theory has been wonderfully successful. It takes, however, the differences in beliefs and objectives that are at its core, as exogenously given. 1 This is an important issue in view of the fact that organizations seem to be more homogenous in beliefs and values than society at large. Such homogeneity may make incentives more effective and may simplify delegation, communication, and coordination (Crawford and Sobel 1982 , Baker 1992 , Crémer 1993 , Aghion and Tirole 1997 , Dessein 2001 . Homogeneity reduces, however, the incentives to collect information (Van den Steen 2002b), which may hinder learning and innovation. Understanding the sources of homogeneity is thus 1 important for the trade-off between markets and organizations and for the design of organizations and incentive systems.
The key argument of this paper is that this homogeneity is at least in part caused by the fact that the members of an organization have a natural tendency to develop homogenous beliefs through shared experiences. 2 Such homogeneity will be especially pronounced in organizations with a long and successful history and with high employee involvement in decision making. Since shared experiences depend on long-term interactions, it is ultimately the permanency of the organization which is the source of this organizational homogeneity.
After establishing these basic results on 'shared beliefs', I link them to the notion of corporate culture. Seminal authors such as Schein (1985) or Kotter and Heskett (1992) have argued that shared beliefs and assumptions are an essential part, if not the essence, of corporate culture. The model in this paper formalizes and formally explains a pattern of 'facts' or informal findings that has been suggested in this literature.
• Organizations in identical circumstances may end up with very different cultures.
• Culture may persist, even though all the original members have left.
• Culture may persist, even though it is almost surely suboptimal.
• The beliefs of the original leader and its early experiences are important determinants of an organization's culture.
• External succession of the CEO is more likely to lead to a change in culture than internal succession.
I also suggest some new results in this context. I show, for example, that in environments with a slow learning rate there will be more diverse cultures across firms and the influence of the CEO's original beliefs will be stronger. The results have further implications. The stability of an organization's values and beliefs might help explain the persistent differences in performance of firms in the same industry (Mueller 1990 , McGahan 1999 . The results on succession and change of culture imply that the boards of well performing firms should be more likely to select an insider successor to a CEO than boards of worse performing firms. Finally, the earlier mentioned result that successful organizations will generate strong cultures raises doubts about the received interpretations of the correlation between culture and performance.
These results are developed in the context of a simple model that tries to capture the learning process of a group of people faced with a new task. One may think of a start-up that tries to organize itself. The group is faced with a set of alternative courses of action, or ways of doing things, among which it must choose. At the start, the performance of the alternatives are unknown, and the agents may openly disagree, i.e. I assume that agents may have differing priors, an assumption that I discuss in more detail in appendix B. By trying out different actions, the group learns over time which ones work best. A relative consensus develops on the best way of doing things. It becomes 'the way we do things around here'. Formally, the model is essentially that of a multi-armed bandit with instant revelation.
The Literature. Research on the origin of homogenous beliefs is, to my knowledge, new to the economic literature. A parallel paper (Van den Steen 2002a) deals with sorting as an alternative source of such homogeneity. 3 Congruity of objectives itself, on the other hand, has been implicit or explicit in a number of key papers in the agency literature (Crawford and Sobel 1982 , Baker 1992 , Crémer 1993 , Aghion and Tirole 1997 , Dessein 2001 . Van den Steen (2002b) interprets some of these in the context of differing beliefs and introduces new aspects, in particular the fact that heterogenous beliefs create incentives to collect information, which may be an important factor in innovation and change.
The economic literature on corporate culture is in its early development. The papers most related to this one are Crémer (1993) and Lazear (1995) . Crémer (1993) defines culture, following Schein (1985) , as a stock of shared knowledge and argues that it improves the efficiency of information processing. The paper, which contains a very interesting model on the coordination effects of shared knowledge, focuses on the effects rather than the causes of shared knowledge. It essentially starts from the premise that culture is useful, apart from some unavoidable side-effects, and tries to explain why. Lazear (1995) also defines culture as 'shared beliefs, values and technology' and considers a 'genetic' evolutionary model of corporate culture, built on the assumption that culture is contagious. His work is complementary to the current paper in that it provides an alternative perspective how culture might evolve. The difference is clearly the level of abstraction, where Lazear takes the genetic nature of culture as a given. He also assumes that culture is useful.
An important alternative model of culture is that presented by Kreps (1990) and further clarified and interpreted by Hermalin (2001) . Hermalin points out that there are in fact two notions of corporate culture in Kreps' paper: culture as a mechanism to coordinate in the presence of multiple equilibria and culture as a reputation for dealing in a specific way with unforseen contingencies. Culture as a coordination mechanism is a pure convention, like driving on the left, and thus very fragile. 4 Culture as reputation is valuable, argues Kreps, since it protects employees against abuses of authority in unforseen contingencies. Hermalin argues, however, that this latter notion is based on a fair amount of 'hand-waving. ' The key difference with the current paper is that the KrepsHermalin model focuses on the effects rather than on the origin of culture, and again seems to start from the premise that culture is essentially good, apart from unavoidable side-effect. Aside from his important discussion of Kreps' model, Hermalin (2001) also summarizes and reinterprets other existing research, and adds to it by linking the topic with insights in other fields of economics, such as IO. Along such lines, Carrillo and Gromb (1999) model corporate culture as production technologies for which employees can make specific investments. The fact that employees choose their investments simultaneously combined with the possibility for the firm to change technology can lead to the coexistence of a strong culture (high investment) equilibrium and a weak culture (low investment) equilibrium. Rob and Zemsky (2002) present a theory in which firms differ in the stationary levels of cooperation among their employees, which they equate with corporate culture, in the sense of a 'stable, [. . . ] , pattern of behavior'. This notion of corporate culture is different from the one used in this paper, but is also very interesting. The model in this paper is further related to the work of Prescott and Visscher (1980) and could be extended to overlap with organization capital in their sense. Note, finally, that Greif (1994) considers 'cultural beliefs' an important part of a national culture. Weber and Camerer (2001) present experimental results that bear on the phenomenon culture.
They let pairs of people ('firms') develop, through trial and error, a homemade language for solving problems, which they interpret as the firm's culture. They then merge groups and show that their performance declines after the merger. A key difference with the current theory is that culture in their sense has an obvious performance advantage. Apart from drawing attention to this important issue of homogeneity, this paper's contributions are to show that organizations have a natural tendency to develop homogeneity through shared experiences, to identify circumstances that enhance this homogeneity, to link it to the notion of corporate culture, to explain the pattern of 'facts' on corporate culture that have been informally suggested by the managerial literature, and to generate some new predictions in this context. Note also that this paper does not assume that homogeneity or culture is good. It just says that homogeneity and culture will tend to develop naturally and that this has important implications.
The next section describes the model of the paper. Section 3 develops the basic homogeneity results, while section 4 considers the pattern of results related to corporate culture. Section 5 concisely discusses potential tests, while section 6 concludes. The appendices contain a further discussion of culture and its definitions and a discussion of the use of differing priors.
The Model
The model tries to capture the situation of a recently formed group that is faced with a new task. One could think of a new product development group which slowly finds its ways, as described in McCaskey (1997) , or a start-up, as in Schein (1985) .
The group will try alternative ways of going about their work, starting with those that its manager considers most effective. Depending on the outcomes, the group will learn and may try other alternatives. Formally, the group is thus faced with a repeated choice among alternative ways of getting things done. Over time, the members of the group come to share beliefs about what works and what doesn't.
Since I want to contrast within-organization belief differences and across-organization belief differences, consider multiple organizations. Each organization consists of one manager, denoted m, and J members, denoted 1 through J. Each organization is faced with an infinitely repeated choice among N action a n ∈ A, that is common to all firms.
The manager chooses in each period t the action a t ∈ A that her organization will undertake in that period. The objective of the manager is to maximize her δ-discounted payoff. Action a has a payoff ρ a . These payoffs are initially unknown to the agents, but each agent has his or her own subjective prior beliefs. 5 Agent i's prior belief is that ρ a is distributed according to some distribution G a,i (ρ) with mean r a,i . Assume that the G a,i are identical up to their mean, i.e. G a,i (u) = G(r a,i , u) where G(x, ·) is a distribution function with mean x and density g(x, ·). Since only the means distinguish these distributions, I will refer to these means r a,i as 'beliefs'. While agents do not observe each others' beliefs, it is commonly known that they may differ. This implies that I do not impose the common prior assumption, an approach discussed in appendix B. 6 The payoffs ρ a and the means of the priors r a,i are given at the beginning of the game. I assume that, empirically, ρ a and r a,i are i.i.d. distributed according to some distribution F . Remember that this latter distribution is not a prior, but an empirical distribution that just happens to reflect the distribution in the population. I will give below two slightly more concrete examples of this setup.
I also assume that the organization's actions and payoffs are costlessly observed by all its members, but by no one else. The assumption that outsiders cannot observe the focal organization's actions and performance is critical to the analysis, but should not be controversial. Competitors of Caterpillar, Walmart, or McKinsey, for example, have tried for years to understand these firms' recipes for success, with little success. There are multiple reasons why it is so difficult to figure out what other organizations are doing. One reason is that it is very difficult to describe and communicate something as complex as an organization's way of doing things. It is like trying to describe a Picasso. Such things are nearly impossible without direct observation and active participation, or (in the case of organizations rather than Picasso's) years of coaching and detailed stories. Another reason is that firms have incentives to keep their successful practices secret. Note that I do not assume that no actions or outcomes can be observed. But I abstract from the dimensions that are easy to observe.
I will discuss later two extensions of this model that essentially relax the assumptions that only the manager can undertake actions and that all the members of the organization costlessly observe all its outcomes.
Two examples
The following are two slightly more concrete examples of the above situation. In each case, the organization consists of one manager and two employees and there are two possible actions, a 1 and a 2 .
1. The outcome of an action is a real-valued payoff ρ a , which is unknown. Agent i thinks that ρ a is distributed ρ a ∼ N (r a,i , 1). So agent i believes that on average the payoff of a will be r a,i , but isn't completely sure about it, and the standard normal expresses that uncertainty. Let F be a standard normal distribution. This means that the two r a 1 ,i and r a 2 ,i of each of the agents are drawn from a standard normal distribution. Note that r a 1 ,i and r a 1 ,j will typically differ. The payoffs ρ a are also drawn from the standard normal distribution.
2. The outcome of an action is either a success or a failure. The probability of success of an action is ρ a = p a , but is unknown. Each agent thinks a priori that p a is distributed according to a Beta distribution with mean r a,i ∈ [ 0, 1 ], and parameters a = 10r a,i and b = 10(1 − r a,i ). This means that agent i thinks that on average action a has the likelihood of success equal to r a,i , but is not completely certain, and the Beta-distribution expresses that uncertainty. Upon trying an action, all members of the organization perfectly observe p a . (So they do not just observe one success or failure, but the probability itself. We could imagine that they observe the consequences of the action and can derive p a from that.) Let, finally, F be uniform. This means that the r a,i are independent draws from U [ 0, 1 ], and the ρ a likewise.
Some notation and preliminary analysis This type of problem is known as the multi-armed bandit problem. In particular, the model corresponds to a multi-armed bandit with N independent arms. In such model, taking an action has two effects: a direct contribution to profits and information about the payoff of that particular action. It is thus not always optimal to simply choose the action with the highest expected payoff: the longer term gain from learning about some other action might outweigh the temporarily lower performance. 
andâ otherwise.
• There exists almost surely a period t ≤ N such that the manager undertakes the same action a * (ω) forever after.
Proof : The first part follows from the fact that the Gittins index (Gittins and Jones 1974) applies, since this is a multi-armed bandit with independent arms and geometric discounting. The Gittins index for rã is the ρ that makes equation (1) hold with equality. Since the index increases in the mean, it is sufficient to consider onlyã andâ. The first part then follows.
For the second part, consider the measure-1 set on which the prior beliefs of the agents are all distinct. Note that, if it is ever optimal for the manager to choose a known actionâ, then that will be optimal forever after.
If an unknown action gets tried after period N , then a known action must have been tried before period N (since there are only N unknown actions), which leads to a contradiction. It follows that after period N only known actions get used, and then it is optimal to useâ forever.
The manager will thus always settle on an action but, as I will show later, not necessarily the best action (Rothschild 1974) .
Shared Beliefs
The central result of this paper is that members of an organization will come to share certain beliefs through shared experiences and that such homogeneity will be stronger in older firms, firms that have been successful, and firms in which employees are involved in decision making. Before getting to these results, I need to be more precise on the meaning and measurement of belief homogeneity, since it plays such a central role in the analysis.
Measuring homogeneity
While homogeneity of beliefs is a straightforward idea, there are multiple ways to formally define and measure it. Each of these makes sense in a particular context. In fact, any specific agency model will typically lead to a slightly different measure of homogeneity.
A very attractive measure of homogeneity is the likelihood that two randomly selected members of the organization agree on the optimal action. Consider the start of period t. Letã t i denote the action that has the highest payoff according to agent i. The first measure of homogeneity is then defined as
where I is the indicator function. A nice aspect of this measure is that it is directly related to the probability that two randomly selected members will 'do the same thing' and thus to 'the way we do things around here.' A shortcoming of H t 1 is that it does not reflect 'how much' two agents agree or disagree. A measure that is very good in this respect is the average squared Euclidean distance (at the start of the period) between the means of the beliefs of two randomly selected members.
This implicitly assumes that differences in beliefs about different actions are equally important. In some cases the beliefs about the current action are relatively more important, which leads to a weighted Euclidean distance. Letǎ denote the action that was chosen last period and let
Other definitions and measures are possible. I will concentrate on the measures above since they span a large spectrum.
Basic homogeneity and its evolution over time
I now come to the most basic result of the paper: that members of the same organization will hold more similar beliefs than society at large. The reason is that they share similar experiences. Since the model was set up to capture this effect, the result should be no surprise to the reader.
To obtain the result formally, I consider three agents of which two, denoted 1 and 2, belong to one organization, say f , while the third agent, denoted 3, belongs to a different organization g. Let a t i denote the action that has the highest payoff according to agent i at the start of period t. The proposition considers all three measures of homogeneity defined earlier earlier.
Proposition 1 For any period t, any two agents 1 and 2 of some organization f , and any agent 3 of some other organization g,
Proof : For the first part of the proposition, fix a set of payoffs (ρ a ) a∈A . Fix an action, sayǎ, and let the sample point ω denote a realization of (ρ a ) a∈A and (r a,i ) a∈A for all relevant agents i in the model.
,1 ∀a ∈ A} denote the event that member 1 considersǎ to be the best action. It is sufficient to show that
, where 1 and 2 are in the same firm, or that
For the second part of the proposition, note that for any agents i and
i when i and j are part of the same organization, the second part follows. The argument ford is analogous.
This formally establishes that joint experience will lead to shared beliefs. Given its potential importance in mediating agency conflicts, understanding the factors that may stimulate such homogeneity is important for the design of organizations and incentives, among other things. The following sections study these factors.
Evolution over time
Since shared experience drives homogeneity, it is reasonable to conjecture that organizations with more experience will be more homogenous. The following proposition says indeed that, in this static model without turnover, older organizations will be more homogenous. More precisely, it says that the probability of agreement between two agents in the same organization increases monotonically over time while the distance between their beliefs decreases monotonically over time.
Proposition 2 For any period t and any members 1 and 2 of the same organization, E[d(r
2 )], and
Proof : For the first two parts of the proposition it is sufficient, by the proof of proposition 1, that the number of action tried by organization f increases over time. This is of course the case. Consider then the last part of the proposition, that the probability of agreement increases over time. Condition on (ρ a ) a∈A , on B t (the revealed set at the beginning of the period), and on {r a,m } a∈A (the set of priors of the principal). Let the current best known action in period t beâ, with performance ρâ. Let k = #(A \ B t ) denote the number of unknown actions.
We need to prove that the probability of two randomly selected agents agreeing increases when the set of known actions goes from B t to B t ∪ǎ, or the number of unknown actions goes down from k to k − 1. Since the proposition is trivial when k = 1, I will assume k ≥ 2. The probability that two agents agree onâ = argmax a∈B t ρ a as the best action is F (ρâ)
2k . The probability that they agree on some particular unknown action is (by independence of their beliefs) the product of the probabilities that one member thinks that action is best. That latter probability is
The overall probability of agreement, given ρâ, is thus
Consider now what happens when a new actionǎ gets tried. If ρǎ < ρâ, then it just is as if one action got removed from A \ B t . The probability of agreement is then
If, however, ρǎ > ρâ, thenǎ becomes the new best known action. DenoteF = F (ρǎ), then the probability of agreement becomes
Combining these equations implies that we need to show that ∆P =F
A long and tedious analysis shows that this holds.
8
Note that this result assumes that the environment is static and that there is no turnover. Especially with change, we will have to be more careful on how to formulate the result although the basic ideas will remain valid. The aspects change and turnover are briefly touched upon in section 4.6
8 The formal proof of this last claim is available from the author. 
Communication and socialization
The basic model assumes that all members of the organization perfectly observe all realizations. This is generally not the case. The flow of information about current and past actions and results depends on the organization's investments in communication and socialization. Such investments may take different forms. Employees may, for example, be involved in decision making to make them more aware of the decisions, trade-offs, and results. New members may be heavily socialized, with stories about the organization's great successes. A firm may be quite explicit about best practice and 'the way we do things around here.' It follows that such investments may be an important determinant of homogeneity. To study this, I relax here the assumption that all employees costlessly observe the organization's actions and outcomes. Instead, explicit investments are necessary to communicate that information. Such investments, however, have no value unless these employees are involved in decision making. 9 So I will relax also the assumption that only the manager can take actions, and will allow all employees to undertake actions that affect the organization's performance. In such world, which organizations will invest most in communication and socialization, and thus become most homogenous? First of all, organizations in which employee decisions are important, since these are the ones that benefit most from employees having the 'right' beliefs. Second, organizations that have experience that is of value to their employees. So I conjecture that organizations with high employee involvement that have been successful in the past will develop very homogenous beliefs.
To study this formally, I focus here on a fairly specific extension of the basic model. Some of the assumptions are driven by analytical considerations.
1. All members of the organization simultaneously undertake actions in each period. The organization's payoff is (1 − β) times the payoff of the manager plus β times the average payoff of the other members.
2. The manager maximizes the organization's overall discounted performance. The other members just maximize their own performance.
3. Actions are unobservable (but each agent knows of course his own actions). None of the members other than the manager directly observes any results. The manager observes her own performance but not that of the other members. 10 4. At the end of period 1, the manager can recommend her first period action to the other members. Such communication costs the organization c > 0.
The results seem to hold without the more specific assumptions, but the analysis becomes very complex. Note also that a 'recommendation' is just a convention, so that there can be two equilibria: one in which employees interpret the manager's 'recommendation' as meaning that the action is 'good' and another equilibrium in which employees interpret a 'recommendation' as meaning that the action is particularly 'bad.' 11 I focus here on the equilibrium in which employees interpret a recommendation as meaning that 'the action is good' since is the most logical, fits reality best, and seems to Pareto-dominate. Lee and Van den Steen (2003) show why communicating 'best practice' is generally more valuable than communicating 'worst failure.' Let the return from the first period action be R.
Proposition 3 The probability of investment increases in β and in R.
Proof : I drop the superscript references to the period (all r's are prior beliefs). Let, wlog., the manager's action in the first period be a 1 . LetV denote the expected per-period payoff of the manager's actions, from the manager's perspective at the start of period 2. Let V 0 denote the total expected per-period payoff, from the manager's perspective at the start of period 2, when the manager does not communicate any information. Without communication, employee actions are essentially random from the manager's perspective. Therefore
. Let P denote the ex-ante probability that the employee will undertake a 1 when the manager recommends it. There are two equilibria. In one, P < 1 N and the recommendation is interpreted as bad. In the other P > 1 N and the recommendation is interpreted as good. As stated earlier, I focus on the second, so that P ≥ 1 N . Let V 1 denote the expected per-period payoff from the manager's perspective at the start of period 2, when the manager does communicate.
The probability of communication thus increases in R.
, then equation (2) will hold with equality for R = α + v. If the employee has a prior r a 1 ,i about
N ,R ↑ ∞, whileR converges to some finite value (for given r a1,i ) as P → 1.
The employee will undertake a 1 upon the manager's recommendation iffR(r a 1 ,i ) ≥ max n≥2 r a n ,i so P = F R (u)
The left hand side evidently strictly increases in P on [ . It follows that there is a unique solution. This point defines the equilibrium and has P ∈ ( 1 N , 1) andR finite. Moreover, as β increases, the right hand side decreases which implies that the probability of investment increases.
The proposition thus shows that beliefs will be more homogenous in successful organizations and when more of the organization's members are involved in decision making
Employee involvement
There is an even more striking result with respect to employee involvement. If all members choose actions and all actions and results are observed by everyone in the organization, then there will eventually be perfect consensus, in the sense that all members of the organization choose identically the same action and agree on its performance.
The formal assumptions of the model are the same as in the last section, except for the observability.
1. All agents simultaneously undertake actions in each period. The organization's payoff is (1 − β) times the payoff of the manager plus β times the average payoff of the other members.
2. The manager maximizes the organization's overall discounted performance. The other members maximize their own performance.
3. All actions and results are perfectly observed by all members of the organization. All members know each others' beliefs. 12
Let a sample pointω denote a realization of all randomness, including mixed strategies. Proof : I first show that a Markov-perfect equilibrium always exists. I do the proof by induction on the size of the set of actions that have been tried, which I denote B. Let for any state S, b(S) = #B. Note first that when b(S) = N (i.e. the set A \ B = B c is empty), it is optimal for all agents to plaŷ a = argmax a∈B ρ a in every period that follows. So, for all states with b(S) = N , the strategies and value function are well-defined. Assume now that the value function and continuation strategies are well defined for all states in which b(S) = k ≥ m. Consider a state S with b(S) = m − 1. Consider now the normal form game with the same set of players, each with B c ∪â as the action set, and the following payoffs. Whenever any agent chooses an action in B c (so that the state will transition to a state with b(S) = k with k ≥ m) each agent gets the respective immediate payoff of his action plus the continuation payoff which follows from the induction step. When all agents chooseâ, the payoffs to all are ρâ (1−δ) . Pick any (possibly mixed-strategy) equilibrium of this normal form game (of which there exists at least one) and define these as the equilibrium strategy for this state. These strategies are well-defined and clearly Markov, and it is straightforward to check that this is indeed an equilibrium. The value functions follow.
For the first part of the proposition, consider a period in which the state is S with b(S) = k. If, in that period, the agents undertake m (distinct) unknown actions a ∈ B c , then the state transitions to some S with b(S) = k + m. Consider now some state S. If the strategy of at least one player, say i, is to play some unknown actionã i ∈ B c with at least some probability, then the state will almost surely transition at some point to a state S with b(S ) > b(S). Since b(S) ≤ N ∀N there can be only a finite number of such transitions, so that, almost surely, after some time only known actions get played. If the strategy is for all players to playâ for sure, then the state remains the same for the next period, so that the same strategy is optimal forever after. It follows that all players playâ forever after. This then completes the proposition. This is actually a very strong result. In the end, all members of the same organization will come to act identically. When only the manager takes actions it often happens that an action never gets tried even though some agent is convinced that that action dominates all others. In that case, disagreement on the optimal action persists. When each agent is free to pursue his or her preferred actions, such disagreement cannot persist. This does still not imply that the members of the organization will try all actions. So it will still happen that their eventual action is not optimal and that different organizations end up with different eventual actions.
Overall, this section has showed that organizations have a natural tendency to develop homogeneity and identified some key factors that play a role in this process. The next section links this natural homogeneity to the concept of corporate culture.
Homogeneity and Corporate Culture
The importance of shared beliefs has not escaped managers or management theorists. Thomas Watson Jr., the legendary manager of IBM, already famously stated that 'I firmly believe that any organization, in order to survive and achieve success, must have a sound set of beliefs on which it premises all its policies and actions' (Watson 1963) . More important, seminal authors on corporate culture, such as Burns and Stalker (1961), Schwartz and Davis (1981) , Peters and Waterman (1982) , Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) , and especially Schein (1985) and Kotter and Heskett (1992) , have defined shared beliefs as an essential part of corporate culture. While other ways of defining culture may be useful, as discussed in appendix A, this clearly suggests shared beliefs are an important part of culture.
The authors who defined culture as shared beliefs have also suggested a pattern of 'facts', based on their case studies (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983 , Schein 1985 , Kotter and Heskett 1992 . These 'facts' are more or less as follows. Organizations in similar circumstances may develop very different cultures, and these cultures may persist even in the view of complete turnover and even when there are clear signs that other cultures may be more effective. An organization's culture is often determined by the beliefs of the original leader and by early experiences, and external succession of the CEO is more likely to lead to a change in culture than internal succession. Strong cultures will be found among older organizations.
The purpose of this section is twofold. First of all, I want to verify that this pattern of 'facts' does indeed hold in the current model. This serves both as a formalization and potential formal explanation of these informally observed 'facts' and as a partial validation of the model. Second, I derive some new implications for corporate culture, in particular the fact that slow feedback from the environment will increase the heterogeneity of cultures across firms and the influence of the CEO's original beliefs.
Since the tractability of the model is much higher with a single decision maker, I will focus on that model and identify the organization's eventual action with its culture. The reason is that in the case of a single decision maker, the eventual action is also the one on which most employees agree as the optimal action. The results seem to extend, in an appropriate sense, to more general models. I will also use the earlier measures of homogeneity as measures for the 'strength' of corporate culture, as discussed in appendix A.
Diversity and origin of culture
The first 'fact' is that otherwise similar organizations may develop very different cultures. I obtain an even stronger result in this model: as the number of alternative actions increases, the probability that two organizations have different cultures converges to 1. To see this formally, let a * f denote organization f 's eventual action or culture.
Proof :
. By proposition 6, P [a * g = argmax a∈A ρ a ] → 0 as N → ∞, so that the proposition follows.
Dysfunctional cultures
The above discussion suggests that the manager does not necessarily settle on the optimal action. In fact, when the number of actions increases, the probability that the manager settles on the optimal action goes to zero. To see this formally, letâ N = argmax a∈A ρ a when A has N elements.
Proof : Fix a given set of potential returns {ρ a n } ∞ n=1 with only the set A N = {a n } N n=1 available to the firm. Letâ N = argmax a∈A N ρ a , which is unique for all N with probability one (which I assume henceforth).
(where B is the set of eventually tried actions), it suffices to show that P [â N ∈ B] → 0 as N → ∞. The probability thatâ N gets tried equals the probability that there is no actionã that (1) has a prior rã ,m ≥ râ N ,m and (2) has a true value ρã such that râ N ,m ≤ ρã −
We can write the latter condition as ρã ≥ h(râ N ,m ) for some increasing function h. Given some râ N ,m , the probability thatã satisfies conditions 1 and 2 is N ,m ) so that, still for given râ N ,m , the probability that no action satisfies
When we go from N to N + 1 actions, the integrand gets multiplied with an extra factor, being either 1 (u) . Either way, with probability one (over the realizations of returns {ρ a n } ∞ n=1 ), the integrand converges to zero for any u, so that P [a * =â N ] → 0. That proves the proposition.
It is thus clear that organizations can have dysfunctional cultures in this model. Moreover, the organization's manager will be aware of the fact that his culture is almost surely suboptimal.
There is another important sense in which cultures in this model can be dysfunctional. While I implicitly treated the payoffs as if they were also the firm's profits, there is nothing in the model that requires this to be the case. If the agents' payoffs differ from these of the firm, we can get very dysfunctional cultures that may eventually destroy the organization. Enron managers, for example, learned that the easy way to success was deceiving shareholders and regulators, and developed a culture that allowed such behavior, which eventually destroyed the firm. NASA engineers learned that things went smoother if they minimized potential problems and just hoped for the best. A culture developed that allowed such behavior to flourish, with disastrous consequences.
The fact that similar organizations can develop very different cultures and that cultures can even be dysfunctional raises the question what factors determine a firm's culture.
Managerial beliefs as a determinant of culture
The management literature suggests that an organization's culture is influenced by the beliefs of founders and early managers (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983 , Schein 1985 , Kotter and Heskett 1992 , Baron et al. 1999 ). The following proposition confirms this effect in the current model. It shows essentially that a certain way of doing things is more likely to become an organization's eventual course of action if the manager originally is very positive about it. 13 Proposition 7 For any actionǎ, the probability that a * =ǎ increases in rǎ ,m .
Proof : The probability thatǎ gets tried increases in rǎ ,m since it equals the probability that there is no actionã that (1) has a prior rã ,m ≥ rǎ ,m and (2) has a true value ρã such that rǎ ,m ≤ ρã −
Conditional on getting tried at least once, all actions are ex ante equally likely to become the eventual action a * . This implies the proposition..
It is also trivial but intriguing that (ex-post) the most influential managers are those under whose early actions the firm was very successful. This corresponds well with the observation that in many, if not most, case studies of firms with a strong culture, the firm had an early leader who had strong beliefs and was successful.
Managerial succession and persistence of culture
Given now the manager's important influence on a firm's culture, what happens when the firm changes managers? The model suggests two results.
1. The culture does not disappear with the manager. In particular, if an insider succeeds the manager, then the culture is likely to be preserved.
2. When an outsider succeeds the manager, however, the culture is more likely to change than with an insider.
These conclusions resonate well with the case studies of management theorists such as Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) or Kotter and Heskett (1992) who have stressed the persistence of culture and the need to bring in new managers as the key step in changing a firm's culture. To study this formally, I need to extend the model to allow for succession. Assume that at the end of each period, there is a probability p that the manager will be replaced by a new one. Assume that a manager only cares about the organization's performance under her own management, and that therefore the probability p is just a factor in the manager's discount factor δ. I will compare the case that the successor is one of the firm's current members, i.e. an insider-successor to the case in which the successor is a member of another organization, i.e. an outsider-successor. Insiders know the organization's history in terms of actions and outcomes. Outsiders have no information about this organization's prior actions and outcomes but do have an equal amount of experience as a member of another randomly drawn firm.
Since I want to compare eventual actions, I will assume that the period t ≥ N . Let a * 1 , a * insider , a * outsider denote the eventual action under respectively the original manager, the insider-successor and the outsider-successor.
Proposition 8 The probability
Proof : Denote by a * 2 , the eventual action of the manager of the outsider-successor's original organization. For the first part of the proposition, fix a set of identical prior beliefs for the insider and outsider successor and a set of ρ a 's. Note that, if they started from scratch, they would arrive at the same eventual action, say a * . Consider now first the case that a * = a * ≥ ρ a * ] ≥ 0.5 by the earlier argument. So it follows that the probability that a * insider = a * 1 must be weakly larger than 1/2 in the limit. Consider next the outsider-successor. Since there is no information transfer, it is as if we consider a similar succession in a completely different organization. An immediate extension of proposition 5 implies then that as N → ∞, the probability of the eventual actions being identical goes to zero.
A change in culture is thus more likely under an outsider than under an insider successor. Simulations suggest that this effect can be large. Table 1 gives the results of 5 simulations with 50 organizations each, in which one manager runs the organization for N periods and then gets succeeded either by one of her organization's own members or by an outsider. The numbers in the table represent the percentage of cases in which the successor eventually chose the same action as the original manager. Clearly, outsiders are much more likely to change the culture than insiders. The effect may have significant implications, as can be seen from the average performance difference column.
Simulation Insider Outsider Avg. % Performance difference  1  68  10  24  2  66  12  19  3  72  14  20  4  64  18  14  5  78  10  20   Table 1 : Percentage of cases in which the eventual action of the successor-CEO is identical to the eventual action of the original CEO, and the average percentage performance difference. The data represent 5 simulations of 50 organizations each. The number of actions was 100.
The effect is essentially one of forced learning: during her tenure, the original manager implicitly chooses what her successor learns. When the successor takes over, he might try out a few changes, but if he doesn't quickly find an action that performs really well, he will fall back on the proven strategy of his predecessor. Combined with the earlier result, this implies that a manager's beliefs may determine an organization's culture even after the manager is gone.
This also suggests a prediction on CEO succession: a rationally acting board of an underperforming firm should select an outsider as successor to a retiring CEO, while the board of an excellent performer should select an insider.
More on the persistence of culture One of the striking things about corporate culture is its persistence over time. Even after all the original members are gone, the organization may still have the same shared beliefs. It is as if the organization has its own personality, independent of individual members.
The above analysis suggests one reason for such persistence. 14 The simulation in table 2 puts more flesh on this idea. It shows the results of simulations of multiple consecutive successions, such that the original manager-founder and the last manager never overlapped. Consider in particular the following simulation. A manager runs the organization for N periods. At that point one of her organization's members succeeds her, while all other members get replaced by new ones who did not observe the organization's earlier history and who do not make inferences about it. 15 After another N periods, the second manager is succeeded by one of the organization's new members. Note that the original manager had left the organization by the time this last manager entered. The results in the table indicate for 5 simulations how often the last manager settles on the same action as the first manager. Although they never met, the first manager's beliefs influence the final manager's actions.
To control for the fact that this might be due to convergence on an optimal action, I ran the simulation simultaneously for two organizations and report in the second and the third column the percentage of cases that the two organizations end up with the same action and their performance difference. Clearly something different than convergence on an optimal action is going on. 
Rate of learning
Apart from formalizing and formally explaining the informally observed pattern of 'facts', we can also derive new insights from the model. An interesting one is the effect of the rate of learning. A natural conjecture would be that in more fuzzy environments, cultures would be more diverse and the influence of the manager's beliefs would be stronger. The current model allows a comparative static that partially captures this. Consider in particular the following interpretation of the model. Assume that the manager can change actions at any point in (continuous) time, but she has to wait at least the duration of a period, denoted ∆, to learn an action's payoff. In any optimal strategy the manager will only change actions at the discrete time points t∆. Since the rate of learning is determined by the length of ∆, and the length of ∆ is reflected in the discrete-time discount rate δ (for a given continuous-time discount rate) , δ captures that rate of learning.
The intuition is now that in an environment where it takes longer to learn about an action's performance, cultures would be more diverse and the influence of the manager's original beliefs will be stronger. To see this formally, let a * f and a * g denote the eventual cultures of randomly selected organizations f and g respectively. 16 Let then, wlog., the actions be numbered such that ρ an ≥ ρ an+1 . Let b k,i denote the event that 'a * i = a k ', which is also the event that 'a k ∈ B i & ∀l < k a l ∈ B i ', where B i is the set of actions that are eventually tried by the manager of agent i. Note that, conditional on (ρ a ) a∈A and with 1 and 2 in different organizations f and g, b n,1 and b n,2 are independent. We have thus that P [a *
2 . Since I can focus completely on one organization now, I will drop the reference to the agent. Let b n andb n denote a * = a n when the discount factor is respectively δ andδ = δ + with ≥ 0. I will argue that (1) (1), note that when ρ a (n+1) = ρ a n then, by symmetry, (1) then follows from the fact that P [b n ] increases when ρ a n increases. For point (2), note that B ⊂B and that ∪ k n=1 b n are exactly all the sample points for which one or more actions a n with n ≤ k will eventually have been tried. So ∪ k n=1 b n = {ω : ∃n ≤ k with a n ∈ B} = ∪ n≤k {ω : a n ∈ B} For any ω for which a n ∈ B, evidently a n ∈B, so that ∪ n≤k {ω : a n ∈ B} ⊂ ∪ n≤k {ω : a n ∈B} or ∪
This proves point (2). By point (2), it follows that there exists a set of events 'α n,m = b n ∩b m '. For m < n, event α n,m denotes the sample points that moved from n to m when the discount factor went from δ toδ. We can writě
tend to zero as → 0, the last term will be dominated in the limit asδ → δ by both other terms. Then we can write
that equation since n > m (and the values go up with lower indices). It follows that
This completes the first part of the proposition. For the second part, let again the (ρ a ) a∈A be given and fix the manager's prior. Letã be the action that the manager originally thinks is best, i.e.ã = argmax a∈A r 0 a,m . Let againδ > δ, so that for any ω, B ⊂B. Since the manager originally thinksã is best,ã ∈ B andã ∈B. If ∀a ∈B ρã ≥ ρ a , then ∀a ∈ B ρã ≥ ρ a . This proves the proposition.
Culture and performance
Historically, the interest in corporate culture has been largely driven by its suggested impact on corporate performance. In particular, works such as Deal and Kennedy (1982) , Peters and Waterman (1982) , or Collins and Porras (1994) have popularized the notion that culture is a driver of performance. Most economic analyses of culture have essentially tried to explain the benefits of culture (Kreps 1990 , Crémer 1993 , although they do explicitly admit to potential negative side-effects.
It is unclear, however, whether this popular notion is really correct. The case studies in these management books (and our casual observations) are subject to important selection biases. More systematic studies are rare and the three systematic studies that are often mentioned in the literature (Kotter and Heskett 1992 , Burt, Gabbay, Holt, and Moran 1994 , Sørensen 2002 ) use the same rudimentary data set. 17 The position of this paper is that 'culture happens' and whether that is good or bad for the organization remains to be seen. Since homogeneity reduces the incentives to collect information, which may hinder innovation and adaptation, culture may sometimes be plainly bad.
Nevertheless, the theory of this paper does predict a correlation between culture and performance, but it is performance that causes homogeneity, and not the other way around. The simulation result in figure 1 suggests that this correlation may be quite strong. It depicts the result of a simulation where a manager takes actions until she settles on some a * . At that point the manager decides whether to communicate a * and its payoff to the members of the organization, who take this information then as given, without any further inferences. With such correlation, it would be understandable that many people get struck by the strong cultures of extreme performers. They are led to conclude that culture must be one of the keys to their success and then try to develop theories to explain this obvious 'fact'.
This result thus questions the inferences that can be drawn from simple regression analyses, such as these by Kotter and Heskett (1992) , and the 'received wisdom' on the relationship between culture and performance.
Other aspects of culture
There are many important aspects of culture that I have not dealt with in this paper, but for which the model could have interesting implications.
Culture and turnover Turnover should weaken the culture, since new members do not possess the same experience as existing members. The situation is more complex than that, however. For one thing, new members will learn from the organization's experience by deducing information from the organization's actions, by (imperfectly) observing the beliefs of colleagues, and from stories about the past successes and failures of the organization. There will also be sorting in the turnover and in the hiring process, which would typically increase homogeneity (Schein 1985 , Van den Steen 2002a . Finally, the impact of turnover on communication and socialization investments is ambiguous: while the effect of socialization is likely higher with new members, the payoff from these investments are lower when members stay shorter.
The role of turnover is thus clearly a research topic on itself. Note that some firms with extremely high turnover are notorious for their strong cultures. Consulting is a case in point.
Culture and Change Culture is often mentioned as an impediment to change. In the current model there does not seem to be such effect, except for a potential spurious relationship in which the belief strength of the organization's members causes both homogeneity and resistance to change. Introducing change in the model could, however, affect the results quite profoundly. Sørensen (2002) argues that a strong culture should reduce the variability of performance and shows that this holds indeed in the data set of Kotter and Heskett (1992) . The current model suggests at least one causal link for such relationship: if members are randomly selected to undertake actions, more homogenous beliefs about what to do will definitely cause more systematic behavior.
Variability of performance
Distinctiveness of culture The analysis in this paper has focused on internal homogeneity. To understand the importance of homogeneity and culture, however, it would be useful to compare this to the heterogeneity of beliefs across organizations.
Testing strategies
The idea that experience and learning may generate homogenous beliefs has been suggested in the context of case studies, of which Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) and Schein (1985) are probably the most famous. Schein (1985) includes this aspect even explicitly in his most formal definition of culture, as discussed in appendix A. While this is encouraging, it is certainly a long way from systematic empirical evidence. Moreover, while these stories fit quite well the idea that firms with a successful history and high employee involvement have the most homogenous beliefs, there is no systematic research on these comparative statics. There is thus a great need for more empirical analysis of homogeneity.
The most direct test of the theory is to measure people's beliefs within and across organizations and test for the relations predicted by the model. The key issue is obviously to find a good instrument for measuring beliefs. While not very common in economics, methods for measuring beliefs have been developed and validated in psychology.
An alternative approach is to take actions as proxies for beliefs and thus test whether behavior is more similar within than across organizations, and whether such similarities relate indeed to things like past performance and age of the organization.
There are also some indirect tests, although the potential for alternative explanations is larger. One possibility is to test whether firms change more under outsider-successors than under insidersuccessors, or that badly performing firms are more likely to hire outsider successors to the CEO. Another possibility is to test whether people who worked for the same organization tend to act in similar ways after they leave. The latter could be tested in the style of Bertrand and Schoar (2001) .
The traditional difficulty of separating learning from sorting may be less of an issue in this context since we are ultimately interested in homogeneity and these are simply substitute mechanisms (Van den Steen 2002a) .
A final possibility are experiments in the style of Weber and Camerer (2001) . A possible setup would have groups of people repeatedly play a (partially random) game and see whether groups develop internally homogenous beliefs about the optimal actions and whether such beliefs can persist over generations of players.
Conclusion
Since homogeneity of beliefs may be an important determinant of agency problems, understanding its origins is important to understand the trade-off between markets and organizations and to decide on incentive systems and organization design. This paper pointed out this very important role of homogeneity and showed that members of the same organization naturally develop such homogeneity through shared experiences. It showed that such homogeneity will be especially pronounced in older organizations with a successful history and high employee involvement. A number of factors play a role in this phenomenon: the organization is permanent, so that there is a considerable number of events over which the members can share experiences; the information on actions and results gets shared within the organization since it is to the advantage of the organization to have its members understand the sources of success and failure; the information spreads less easily to other organizations since the focal organization usually has incentives to keep the information private and since it is often difficult to communicate the information, except through direct observation or repeated rich stories.
I then connected this homogeneity to the notion of corporate culture and show how the model formalizes a pattern of 'facts' that have been informally suggested by the literature on culture. The analysis thus suggests an explanation for these 'facts' while at the same time partially validating the model. I also showed that a lower rate of learning leads to more diversity of cultures and increases the impact of the founder. I finally questioned the received interpretation of the correlation between culture and performance, based on the earlier conclusion that strong performance will cause homogeneity.
Although there is some informal evidence that lends support to the theories of this paper, there a clear lack of systematic empirical evidence. This should be a priority area for future research.
This paper seems to have only scratched the surface. Lots more questions remain on both the causes and the effects of homogeneity.
A Corporate Culture
When coming into contact with an organization, people are often struck by the fact that members of the organization seem to act and think similarly, but differently from members of similar other organizations. It is as if each organization has its own 'personality.' Moreover, this 'personality' may remain remarkably constant over time. Even when many of the original members are gone, the new generation thinks and acts in very much the same way as their predecessors. It is essentially this character of an organization, which some have more than others, that has been called its 'culture.' Given the rather vague phenomenon, it is not surprising that there are many divergent definitions in the literature. Moreover, as the term became more popular, it also began to live a life of its own. Lazear (1995) provides a survey of alternative definitions. Rather than trying to replicate such survey here, the purpose of this section is to present the view in the management literature on which this paper is based, and compare it to some key alternatives.
A.1 Examples of corporate culture
To fix ideas it is useful to start out with presenting examples, drawn from personal experience and case descriptions.
The first example is a comparison between the Brussels offices of Arthur D. Little and McKinsey in the mid to late nineties. These local offices served similar clients, were started at about the same time and were similar both in size and in personnel composition.
Arthur D. Little's consultants proudly stated that their firm was an organized chaos or chaotic organization and that it had as many strategies as there are consultants. While formal training existed, every team really went its own way. Data analysis was not so important, but listening to people was key. Conclusions were often backed up by quotes from clients, or by stories. It was important to have an open mind and not to come too quickly to conclusions. There were very few formatting standards for presentations. Performance evaluations were done every few months via informal 5-minute chats. Every consultant was responsible for his or her own staffing via a market-based system. People took lunch while working in their office. Team lunches were exceptional. Arthur D. Little called itself 'the Company.'
McKinsey's well-developed consulting methodology, on the contrary, guided each study pretty closely. A new study started by collecting all 'knowledge' about similar studies that had been conducted in the past in other offices. From the start of the study, consultants were supposed to think in terms of final client recommendations. Any conclusion had to be backed up by data. There were strict formats for the presentations, decided upon by a global committee of senior directors. There was a clear one-firm policy: the process, rules and systems should be similar all around the globe. Consultants got evaluations every 6 or 12 weeks, using extensive and formal evaluation forms. Staffing was centralized and future assignments were chosen to improve on weaknesses. Consultants spent nearly all their time at the client site. Lunch (and for out-of-office teams also dinner), were taken as much as possible with the team. McKinsey called itself 'the Firm. ' These were two firms that were essentially in the same business but worked in very different ways. There were no obvious structural limitations or legacy systems that prevented one to switch to the other's model. Both were aware of the differences. In fact, these differences in behavior reflect differences in opinions and beliefs among the most senior people about the relative importance of 'the one best way of doing things,' individual creativity, teamwork, the most effective process of doing consulting, etc. A telling fact is that new consultants at McKinsey receive a copy of the book Perspective on McKinsey, by Marvin Bower, McKinsey's de facto founder. The book is accompanied by a memo from Bower, urging 'not to give or loan copies to people outside the Firm.' The book essentially gives Bower's perspective on the 'lessons that I believe might be learned from our successes, mistakes, and failures, [. . . ] .' Some McKinsey people refer to it as 'the bible.' It seems a conscious effort to influence the beliefs of new employees. The fact that it is explicitly for internal use only, is a clear statement that this is not posturing for the outside world, but valuable information from which new employees can and should learn.
Cultures also comes in less functional forms. Some companies, such as the former Enron, encourage their people to be aggressive and push limits, even if it gets them close to legal limits. Other organizations, including some government administrations, have implicit shared beliefs that initiative creates personal risks without rewards. Some firms have a strong 'nine to five' culture while in others people always stay late, even if they don't have anything to do. Cultural differences can also relate to the importance of consensus, the treatment of new employees, the level of confrontation, the level of cooperation, the competitiveness, the implicit importance and status of engineers versus marketers, the existence of reserved parking spots for top management, open or closed door policies, etc.
Note that cultures can also develop along other dimensions than firms. We can talk, for example, about a sales culture versus a production culture, or about the culture of academic economists as opposed to that of academic sociologists or engineers. Each of these groups have a set of common experiences they go through, and develop a set of shared beliefs.
A.2 Definition of corporate culture and the role of learning
Since culture is a complex social phenomenon, it has multiple dimensions and therefore multiple potential definitions, that all have their value in the right context. While I mention some alternative definitions below, this paper uses what seems to be the most prevalent definition in the management literature: corporate culture as shared values, beliefs, and assumptions which generate behavioral norms and 'the way we do things around here.' Note that the management literature often uses the terms values and beliefs almost interchangeable.
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This idea of culture as shared beliefs or values goes back at least to Burns and Stalker (1961) who, in their seminal discussion of 'organic' versus 'mechanistic' organizations, define culture as 'a dependable constant system of shared beliefs.' Other early contributions were the work of Baker (1980) and Schwartz and Davis (1981) who defined culture respectively as 'some interrelated set of beliefs, shared by most of their members' and 'a pattern of beliefs and expectations that is shared by the organization's members.' A key impetus in popularizing the notion of culture was the bestseller In Search of Excellence by Peters and Waterman (1982) , who defined culture as 'shared values' but stress that they also mean 'basic beliefs. ' Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) , which is often considered a seminal work on corporate culture, do not mention the word culture, but talk instead about managerial beliefs. Most of these authors suggest that a culture can have subcultures.
Probably the most cited perspective on corporate culture is that of Schein (1985) . He defines culture as having three levels. The most visible, but most superficial, level is that of culture as a pattern of behavior. It is 'the way things are done around here,' the norms, the stories, the symbols. These behavioral patterns reflect a second, deeper, level of culture, which are the firm's shared values. Shared values are on their turn driven by the third and most fundamental level of culture: shared assumptions. Kotter and Heskett (1992) base their definition on Schein (1985) , but eliminate the distinction between beliefs and values. Note that, although these authors focus on culture as shared beliefs, their ultimate interest is in the behavioral implications of such theory. But to develop a systematic theory of that behavior, the idea is that we must look deeper, to values and beliefs.
This literature that defines culture as shared beliefs and assumptions also often mentions the role of learning. Schein (1985) deems the process of shared experience so crucial that he even includes it in his definition of corporate culture as 'a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. ' Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) claim that 'although the founders' personal beliefs lie at the heart of the belief system, corporate history also plays an important part in shaping current beliefs. As the founders and their successors manage by their principles, their experiences lead them to modify the system through the process of incremental change. ' Schwartz and Davis (1981) state that 'culture reflects what has worked in the past.' In their analysis of how cultural change can occur, Kotter and Heskett (1992) observe that 'the importance of results cannot be overstated. These new cultures grew in a cycle that was driven by successful results.' All these remarks suggest that culture is developed to a large extent through joint learning from the company's experiences.
As mentioned earlier, however, there are important alternative to this idea of culture as shared beliefs.
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An important alternative is the idea that culture is simply a set of conventions, arbitrary 'ways we do things around here'. This is similar to the first notion of culture in the Kreps-Hermalin model. As mentioned earlier, this requires a shared belief about what exactly the coonvention is, and shared beliefs about the world will facilitate the development of conventions.
20 To other important alternatives are the notion of culture as shared language or meaning and the notion of culture as group norms. (Note that a convention is an arbitrary rule that solves a coordination problem while a norm has a moral implication.) Finally, Martin (1992) suggests a 'fragmentation' perspective that has a 'focus on ambiguity as the essence of organizational culture.' Martin recognizes that 'the Fragmentation perspective is difficult to discuss with clarity' and considers it to be founded in the postmodernist tradition. Some would call it an anti-theory, a theory about the non-existence of theory. In her discussion, Martin explicitly states that the Integration perspective, of which this paper is essentially part, 'has become the dominant view of organizational researchers and practitioners.'
A.3 Measuring Culture
When we define corporate culture as shared beliefs, there are essentially two interpretations for the notion of the 'strength' of a culture:
1. Internal homogeneity: the degree to which people within the firm share the same beliefs.
2. External heterogeneity: the degree to which these common beliefs are different from the beliefs of the population at large, or from the beliefs of other organizations.
To prevent confusion, some of the literature, reserves the term 'strength' for the first concept (i.e., for the degree of homogeneity of beliefs within the firm). I will therefore use 'distinctiveness' to denote the second concept, the degree of difference with the population at large.
A.4 The Difficulty of Communicating Information
The development of shared beliefs that differ from those of other organizations, as envisioned by this paper, presumes that information and experience are more easily shared within than across organizations. It should be uncontroversial that some information is indeed difficult to communicate. Try the following 'thought experiment.' Observe a person on the street during one second. Now try to describe that person to someone else in such detail that the other would be able to recognize the person with the same ease as you yourself would. This would take a tremendous amount of time, if it is at all possible. This idea that some information is difficult to communicate is well captured by Confucius' 'Tell me and I will forget, Show me and I will remember, Involve me and I will understand!' This is further compounded by the incentives for organizations to keep their information and experience private, especially in competitive circumstances. Note also that transfer of information is very difficult to contract on. Within the firm the situation is very different. The competitive concerns are much less. More importantly, employees are active participators in and direct observers of the firm's action and outcomes. Communication with existing employees happens thus to some extent automatically, although the firm can still manage this by, for example, the degree to which it involves employees in decision making. The means to socialize new members are also much more effective. Apart from things like trainings and seminars, new members are often told to follow a specific methodology. As they discover the merits of the method and start using it independently, they become in fact socialized.
B A Note on 'Differing Beliefs' in Economic Modeling
The model in this paper differs in one respect from many economic models: the agents knowingly entertain differing beliefs (without having private information). The reason for this assumption is pragmatic: differences in beliefs are at the heart of the issues studied here, and assuming common knowledge of differing beliefs is the most transparent and parsimonious way to study this question. Differing beliefs do not contradict the economic paradigm: while rational agents should use Bayes' rule to update their prior with new information, nothing is said about those priors themselves, which are primitives of the model. In particular, absent any relevant information agents have no rational basis to agree on a prior.
21 Harsanyi (1968) , for example, observed that 'by the very nature of subjective probabilities, even if two individuals have exactly the same information and are at exactly the same high level of intelligence, they may very well assign different subjective probabilities to the very same events'. The best argument for the traditional use of common priors is Aumann's (1987) argument that they allow us to 'zero in on purely informational issues'. Conversely, differing priors allow us to zero in on the implications of open disagreement and differing beliefs. Note, finally, that the existence of the winner's curse, any disagreement on the correct action when utilities are aligned, and nearly all evidence on bounded rationality and biases in decision making imply empirically the existence of differing priors. For a further discussion, see Morris (1995) , the discussion between Gul (1998) and Aumann (1998) , Yildiz (2000) , or Van den Steen (2002c) .
The model with common priors It is actually theoretically possible to develop this model under the common prior assumption. In particular, assume that:
• Agents have a common prior.
• All agents get a private signal about each action.
• All employees of a firm observe the manager's signal.
• Agents cannot in any way observe each other's beliefs.
This setup makes the agents behave as if they have differing priors. While it sticks pro forma to the tradition of a common prior, it does so artificially. I therefore prefer to call a cat a cat and work with differing priors.
21 A traditional argument against differing priors is that rational people would argue until they reach agreement. There are 3 reasons why this argument does not hold. First of all, any fact that is presented in the discussion brings with it potentially differing priors about the relevance of the fact or the precision of the data. This leads immediately to an infinite regress of arguments. Second, what matters for economic analysis is not so much whether agents can theoretically come to agreement but whether they do at the time they have to take an action. Finally, as argued in the main paper, much information is difficult, if not impossible, to communicate. Note also that under the common prior assumption, agents with aligned utility functions should never disagree on the optimal actions to undertake. On a sinking ship or in the heat of a battle (where survival is supposedly the common objective), there should always be perfect agreement on the optimal course of action. This seems to contradict our intuition.
